THE AMERICAN

Law Register and Review.
PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Editors:
THOMAS JAMES MEAGHER. Editor-in-Chief,
GEORGE HENDERSON,
ARTHUR G. DICKSON,
HORACE L. HENDERSON,
WALTER C. DOUGLAS, JR.,
DILWORTH P. HIBBERD,
CYRUS D. FOSS. JR.,
WILLIAM B. LINN,
THOMAS S GATES,
BENJAMIN F. PERKINS.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $5.00 PER ANNUM.

SINGLE COPIES, 50 CENTS.

Address all literary communications to the EDITOR-IN-CnIEI, Department of Law,
University of Pennsylvania, Sixth and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.; all business communications to W. S. ELLIS. Esq., 736 Drexel Building, Philadelphia, Pa.

The American Law Register and Review
having passed into the hands of students of the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania, acting under the
direction of a Graduate Board, a brief notice of the conditions
under which the new editors begin work, may not be out of
place.
At the opening of the Academic year, the Law School
removed from its cramped quarters on the sixth floor of the
Girard Building to its present comfortable and historic home
in the court buildings in Independence Square. The rooms
occupied at one time by the Congress of the United States,
and recently by the Courts of Common Pleas, are used as
THE MAGAZINE.

lecture rooms.

The old Criminal Court building, facing on

Sixth street, has been remodelled to suit the other requirements of the school. The first floor contains the various
offices and conversation rooms. On the second floor is a
commodious and admirably well lighted library.

The change

of location and so greatly improved accommodations seemed
to bring with them a new interest and activity among the

members of the school.

The Faculty, in offering new courses,

NOTES,

and in showing in other ways their desire to meet the students'
needs, stimulated the interest. One outgrowth was the desire
oil the part of some of the students, in view of the large proportions to which the school had grown, to have it represented
by a worthy legal magazine. The present arrangement is the
result,
As to the future policy of the Law Register and Review, as
was announced in the last issue, no immediate distinct change
is in view. At the same time, the new editors will endeavor
in every way in their power steadily to improve the magazine,
and they venture the hope that its futpre may be even more
than worthy of its past,
IS THE

SEVENTEENTH

ARTICLE

OF THE CONST'rUTION

OF

The first eleven sections of
the article in question relate to tlhe imposition of certain restrictions upon railroad and canal corporations. These are that
all such corporate companies shall be common carriers; a
prohibition of any undue or unreasonable discrimination in
charges for, or in facilities for, transportation of freight or passengers within the state; non-absorption of one parallel or
competing line by another ; denial of the power of a common
carrier company to prosecute or engage in mining or manufacturing articles for transportation over its own works; no officer
or agent of an), railroad or canal company shall be interested
in the business of transportation as a common carrier of fieight
or passengers over the works owned, leased, or controlled by
splch company; and the prohibition of the giving of rebates
and free passes, The twelfth section is : " The general assembly shall enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." The appropriate legislation suggested in the
above section as a matter of fact has never been enacted by
the general assembly. The consequence is that the seventeenth article of the State Constitution has been practically
a dead letter, The very matters intended to be prevented.by
this article have not only not been crushed out, but have even
been increased and fostered by corporations. The question
has been recently brought squarely before one of the county
PENNSYLVANIA SELF-ENFORCING?
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courts.

A bill in equity was filed in the Dauphin County

Court of Common Pleas by the Harrisburg Rolling Mill
Company against the Pennsylvafnia Railroad Company, because
of a breach of one of the sections of the article in question.
Judge Simonton, in his opinion, declared this article to be
self-enforcing; that regardless of the lack of legislation in conformity with the twelfth section, nevertheless a breach of any
provision of the first eleven sections will of itself be sufficient
cause for the courts to lay hold of the offending party or corporation. The point will probably be reviewed by the Supreme
Court of the state; and it is evident that should the position
taken by the lower court be sustained, a vast amount of litigation would follow and various acts of railroad and canal companies prohibited in the letter would then be prohibited in fact.
MURDER A NATIONAL ISSUE.

In a charge to the Federal

Grand Jury at Fort Smith, Arkansas, at the beginning of the
present month, Judge Parker. of the United States District
Court, made some striking statements. According to Judge
Parker, the number of persons who have been murdered in the
United States in the last five years is six times larger than the
Continental Army at the close of the Revolution, and the
number murdered last year is greater than our standing army
at the outbreak of the Civil War. "The issue before the
country," he declared, "is not money or tariff, but whether or
not we are able to guarantee proper protection to life. The
people should demand of the courts that they discountenance
intrigue and hair-splitting distinctions in favor of the criminals.
The Appellate Court exists mainly to stab the trial judge in
the back and enable the criminal to go free."
These statements, particularly the abuse of the right of
appeal, and of the technical avenues of escape or delay, will
find a widely sympathetic hearing. But the other side must
not be lost sight of. Under the Austrian Code, for instance,
with its restrictions upon the right of appeal, there were, during
the past year, eight persons who suffered the punishment of
death, and were afterwards discovered to have been innocent.
And this was all within a single year. One turns with horror
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from such a travesty of justice. The feeling will always be, we
hope, that it is better for a dozen guilty to escape than for one
innocent to suffer. Surely the man on trial for his life deserves
as much technical protection as one indicted for a less serious
crime, or involved in a civil suit. All humanitarian arguments,
however, are met by the unanswerable fact that the number of
murderers punished is not at all in proportion to the number
of murders committed. There is a humanitarian argument on
the other sid.x The peace and safety of the community must
be protected. In order that the one innocent may not suffer,
although a dozen guilty escape, it is hardly necessary that but
one guilty person should suffer where almost a dozen escape.
The looseness of public sentiment, a maudlin sympathy for the
murderer, especially where he commits his crime with the
slightest show of justification, are largely to blame for the
horrible prevalence of murder in American communities. A
study of the daily papers showing the murders happening every
week, and a study of the records showing the number who
meet with justice, present but one conclusion. Some reform
is demanded. There should be a more rigid public sentiment; our cities should be more effectively policed; and our
courts, whether through a change in the jury system, or in the
rules of procedure, including the unrestricted right of appeal,
or in both, should be made a more efficient means of punishing murderers, and indeed criminals of every class,
METHODS or LEGAL EDUCATION. Within the last few years,
much discussion has taken place upon the relative merits of
the different methods by which aspirants for the legal profession receive their instruction, a subject at once of serious import
both to the student himself and to the client whom he shall
serve. And closely akin to this question, since a very great
majority of law schools are connected with and made a part of
our colleges and universities, is the one-what relation shall
the department of law bear to the institution with which it has
been associated? This last question was discussed in a paper
by Prof. Earnest W. Huffcut, of the Cornell Law School,
before the American Bar Association, at its session of 1895,
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held in Detroit-a summary of which article, written by the
author himself, appeared in the October number, 1895, of this
periodical. Both questions have been recently dealt with at
the Thirty-second Scientific Session of the American Academy
of Social and Political 'Science, held at Philadelphia, in a
paper by Professor George Wharton Pepper of the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania, followed by a
discussion, participated in by Professor James Barr Ames, of
Harvard, and members of the Philadelphia Bar.
"A young American," said the writer, "who desires to
begin the study of law to-day, is in most jurisdictions permitted to choose between three avenues of approach to the
bar." He said that the first, and formerly the universai way,
was by studying in the office of a practicing attorney. If,
however, he desires to supplement his office instruction, he
may attend a law school, which is so conducted as to permit
the student time for office work. Finally, he may enter a
university law school, where law is taught like other great
sciences. The first way, he observed, is fast becoming a relic
of the past, since the modern law office has ceased to be
a suitable place for study and since the student's function of
usefulness there has been supplied by stenographers, typewriters and clerks.
In regard to the second avenue of approach, he said that
undoubtedly there is room in every great city for a school of
this class, and that its rolls will always be filled with men, who
have no intellectual interest in the law as a subject of study or
whose necessities prevent them from giving their undivided
time and attention to legal study during their course.
In dealing with the third method-that to which he directed
the greater part of the discussion-he said that the duty of the
university is to answer the cry of those who call for higher
legal education. If our law is not a science worthy to be
taught like other sciences, then " a university will best consult
its own dignity by refusing to teach it."

Without addressing himself to the solution of the problem
of what is the best system of instruction in a law school as an
independent institution, he took the ground that, when con-

NOTES.

nected with our great schools of learning, the preliminary
requirement for admission should at least equal that for
admission to the freshman class in the college; that the instructors should be men who have made teaching their sole
occupation, giving to it their whole time and energy; and that
the "case system" is the method of instruction which is found
to produce the best results. A student should, under competent leadership, strike out for himself in the investigation which
is to become his life work and devote himself to a study of the
cases themselves, directing his efforts to the deduction of those
principles, upon which or their developments, the correct
deposition of all legal controversies must rest.
Professor Ames expressed his entire accord, and said, as a
practical result of the inductive method, that it had been
ascertained by actual investigation made for the express purpose, that the graduates of this system in a few years demonstrate their superiority as sound and capable legal advisers;
that the Bar of Boston, though formerly displaying considererable opposition to the introduction of Professor Langdell's
method of study have now with practical unanimity acquiesced
in the belief of the surpassing merit of that system. But
Professor Ames said that the most signal triumph of the new
method was in Harvard's law faculty. The old system was
not abrogated at a single stroke, neither was the change the
result of legislation on the part of the University authorities.
Each professor in the Law School conducted his own department in accordance with his own judgment, and for several
years, the faculty was divided. One by one, however, they
have become converts to the case system; and several of
those who were at first determined in their opposition to it,
are now enthusiastic in its support.
PARRICIDE'S RIGHT TO INHERIT

His

FATHER'S ESTATE.

The

decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the recent
case of Carpenter's Estate, reported in 170 Pa. St. 203, and 32
Atlantic Reporter, 637, has attracted considerable attention
and some unfavorable criticism. The decision is to the effect
that a son who has murdered his father for the purpose of

NOTES.

securing his father's estate is entitled to take under the intestate laws. His crime does not destroy his right of inheritance. The decision is based upon Art. I., § I9, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1874, which declares that "no
attainder shall work corruption of blood."
The argument against the decision may be stated as follows
This is an interpretation of the State Constitution, which by
its narrowness and by its tendency to observe the letter rather
than the spirit of the law, runs counter to public policy and
imputes to the framers of the State Constitution, an intention
which it is unreasonable to suppose they had.
In the interpretation of a statute, every effort is made to discern the intention of the Legislature and thus to arrive at the
equity of the statute. It will be conceded that the same rule
must apply in the interpretation of a clause in the Constitution. What, then, is the evident intention of a constitutional
provision that no attainder shall work corruption of blood ?
Plainly, it is to express the modern aim of criminal jurisprudence, which looks to the reformation rather than the destruction of the wrongdoer. Now, is it conceivable that this provision, which was framed in accordance with public policy,
could have been intended at the same time to oppose it?
This it certainly does, as interpreted in Carpenter'sEstate.
It is a fundamental principle that a man may not profit by
his own fraud. If he is not allowed to take advantage of his
fraud, how much more should he be forbidden to profit by his
own crime, and that crime parricide!
Is it to be supposed that the Constitution looks to such a
result as we now see ?
Because to the modern mind, it seems unjust that a criminal
should be deprived of the lands and goods which he has in
his possession, does it follow that he should be permitted to
retain property, for the sake of the acquirement of which, he
became a criminal ?
An able writer in the New York Law Journal,criticizing
this decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, suggests
that the familiar equitable principle of constructive trusts be
applied in such case, making the criminal a trustee for the
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benefit of the person wronged, or his representatives, thus conserving the public interests without opposing the constitutional
provision against attainder. This seems to point out a safe
and reasonable course, observing due respect for the letter of
the law, and at the same time attaining a result in accord with
its true spirit, a result based upon the best public policy.
A little more liberality, a trifle less of that narrowness to
which our courts too often lend themselves, and the result
would be fewer judicial decisions which tend to perpetuate that
feeling of distrust in the law, and that impatience with legal
methods, which have always to some extent possessed the
popular mind.
In answer to the above argument it may be said, and we think
this the preferable position, that the decision is an inevitable result of a consistent following of a well-established rule of interpretation of written law, namely, that when expressed in distinct
and unambiguous language, the intention of the framers must be
gathered from the words used, taken in their ordinary meaning;
and that such intention thus expressed supersedes any unwritten
rule formulated by the courts, which is in contravention thereof.
Starting with this premise an investigation of the facts of the
case in question leads to the conclusion that, however shocking to one's sense of morality and justice the consequences of
the decision may be, no justifiable and legal means of escape
therefrom offered themselves to the court. At the very
threshold of its investigation of the case,'the court was met by
two definite and binding statements of law, embodied in the
Constitution and statutes of the state, which were absolutely
decisive of the case unless their effect be mitigated, and, in
fact, annulled, by some other rule of law of equal force. In
the first place, the Constitution prohibits any attaint of treason
or felony by the Legislature, and any corruption of blood by
reason of attainder, or any forfeiture of estate, except during
the life of the offender; and, in the second place, the intestate laws provide, in unqualified and imperative language, that
if there be a son, he shall inherit the estate of the father*
Now, if the words of the Constitution and statute have any
meaning, and if written law be any longer binding upon the
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courts, it would have been an unjustifiable usurpation of
judicial prerogative, in the face of a constitutional prohibition,
to have added the punishment of attainder to that of the
death penalty imposed by law, and to have created an exception to the laws of inheritance, which the Legislature made
without exception. Nothing could be more plainly exprezsed.
more obligatory in its character, or more universal in its
terms, than the prohibition of the Constitution that "no person
shall be attainted of treason or felony by the legislature."
And if the framers of the Constitution, and the people who
adopted it, thought attainder for crime, that relic of barbaric
ages, so inconsistent and incompatible with the legal sense of
modern civilization, as to put it absolutely without the power
of the Legislature to add it to the other legal punishments, it is
utterly inconsistent to accuse the Supreme Court with stickling
at technicalities in refusing to usurp to itself that same power,
Only by the most violent perversion of the text of the Constitution could an interpretation be put upon the words " no
person shall be attainted," that would permit an exception on
the sole ground that the felon took profit from his own wrong.
To indulge such an interpretation would be to alter in a very
material and unwarrantable manner, the most inviolable form
of the expression of the will of the people. Confronted by
such unequivgcal and comprehensive language, it was not for
the court to say that the sovereign mind did not hold attainder
to be so detestable in its nature that it intentionally refused its
assent to the infliction of such a punishment in an)' case whatsoever.
Such is the undeniable meaning of the words used in the
Constitution ; and if it be no longer the conviction of the sovereign mind, then it remains to the same supreme power, which
put forth the edict to revoke it. The sanctity of organic law
forbids that the courts should attempt to create an exception to its express terms, and so effect a revocation pro tanto.
upon the authority of such a variable rule of public policy as
that no man shall profit by his own wrong. Granted that the
rule exists, it is subject to many exceptions in less obligatory cases; for the courts frequently find themselves unable to
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refuse a benefit to a wrongdoer, because he is entrenched in
his claim behind a rule of positive law. Such cases are continually calling from the courts expressions of regret that they
are thus prevented from withholding firom a party an unmerited benefit which the law accords him. The rule may be
consistently and profitably invoked in the absence of controlling written law, or in the interpretation of an ambiguous enactment upon a subject. But where both the Constitution and statute law of a state speak in plain and unmistakable terms to
the point, as they do in this case, there is no justification for
introducing it. under the guise of interpretation, to contract or
nullify their effect.
And the difficulty of the situation does not seem to be
obviated by the proposed method of constituting the son
a trustee to hold the legal title for the benefit of the personal
representatives of the father. To say the least, such a treatment of the case. would offend the spirit, if not the letter, of both
the Constitution and the intestate laws. It would deprive the
son of the substantial benefit of the right of inheritance given
him by the intestate law, although it must be conceded that
just such a benefit was the one intended to be secured to him
by the statute. It would be a virtual abrogation of a general
law to meet the exigencies of a particular case, and the courts
have always conceded this to be beyond their power. No less
would the trust theory be contradictory to the Constitution.
So far as the property involved in the case is concerned, it
would lead to a virtual attainder; it would lead to the most
objectionable feature of that unjust form of punishment, by
visiting upon the children the sins of the father; it would put
the innocent family of the offender under the criminal ban, and
impose upon them unmerited punishment, by precluding them
from the enjoyment of property that would otherwise legally
descend to them upon his death.
In the face, therefore, of the facts that the Constitution and
statute cover the contested point in a plain and obligatory
manner, and that the only ground for creating an exception
thereto is an undefined public policy that is held inoperative in
other like cases, the refusal of the Supreme Court to arbitrarily
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add another form of punishment for murder to the one
already prescribed by law, was not only justifiable but legally
inevitable.
This questiun of whether a forfeiture of the benefits flowing
from a murder committed, shall be added to the penalty
attached by law, has arisen in the courts of the several states,
in connection with the interpretation of statute laws, and a
divergence of opinion has been the result. In North Carolina,
the question was whether a widow, convicted of being accessory before the fact for murder of her husband, had forfeited
her right to dower in the real property of which her husband
died seised ; and it was held that inasmuch as the right was
statutory, and the only provision contained in the statute
whereby the criminal conduct of the wife should bar a recovery
was in case of her committing adultery, she could not be
legally deprived thereof: Czevens v. Ozcns, IOO N. C. 240
(i888.)
In New York State, the case arose under the statute of wills:
.Riggs v. Palmr, I 15 N. Y. 506 (1889). A devisee under a
will murdered the devisor to obtain possession of the property;
and it was decided that by reason of the crime, the beneficiary
had forfeited all right to claim under the will, or as heir or
next of kin. The North Carolina case was commented upon
and disapproved. The court refused to give the same binding
effect to the letter of the statute law that the North Carolina
court had done, but maintained that it must be interpreted in
the light of the co-existent rule of law that no man shall profit
by his own wrong. To this liberai method of interpreting the
written law two of the judges dissented.
Two years later the Supreme Court of Nebraska was called
upon to determine whether a father who had murdered his
daughter in order to succeed to her property under the intestate laws, had a vested interest at her death, that could not be
forfeited for the crime : Shlhizbc;gcr ". Ransom, 3 i Neb. 61
(i891).
Influenced by the decision in Rigs v. Palmnc, the
court were of opinion that, while by a literal interpretation of
the statute the right to the property was in the father, yet the
statute must be interpreted as being subject to an exception in
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a case where the devolution of the property is brought about
by the crime of a person entitled thereunder, and, therefore,
the father could not take the estate. On a rehearing of this
same case, three years later, 59 N. W. Rep. 935 (1894), the
court reversed their previous decision and decided that the
statute law gave the father an interest that could not be
forfeited for his crime.
Following upon this case came the case under discussion.
The result is, that at the time of the decision in this
case, two of the three decisions in the state courts were
against the possibility of creating an exception to the
statute law, on account of its provisions being brought into
force through the crime of the person to be benefited thereunder; while in the third case, a forfeiture was sustained by
a divided court.
The opposing views of the courts upon the extent to which
they are bound to a literal following of the written law, or
how far they may seek extraneously for the intention of the
framers of the law, may best be illustrated by quotations from
the cases. In delivering the opinion in the New York case,
Earle, J., said: "It was the intention of the law-makers that
the donees in a will should have the property given them.
But it never could have been their intention that a donee
who murdered the testator to make the will operative should
have any benefit under it. If such a case had been present to.
their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make
some provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that
On the other hand, in
they would have provided for it."
Shellenberger v. Rawson, Ryan, C., says: "The intention of
the Legislature is free from doubt. The question is not what
the framers of our statute of descent would have done, had
it been in their minds that a case like this would arise, but
what, in fact, they did, without perhaps anticipating the possibility of its existence. This is determined, not by hypothetical
resort to conjecture as to their meaning, but by a construction
of the language used."
It is worthy of note that, in a New York case, Ellerson v.
Westcott, 42 N. E. Rep. 540, decided since Carpenter'sEstate,
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the effect of the decision in Riggs v. Palmer has been limited
and defined. It is there held that a testamentary instrument
is not rendered void on account of the murder of the testator
by a donee, but that the criminal will be prevented from enjoying any benefit under the will.

